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Abstract 
 
Lack of vigilant oversight functions by the board of 
directors could be said to be the cause of corporate 
accounting improprieties. This study set out to 
determine the extent at which board size and 
structure affect corporate financial performance; 
determine the extent to which directors’ 
stockholding affects corporate financial 
performance; and investigate the relationship 
between CEO duality and corporate performance. 
 
The study should be useful to investors, industry 
regulators and related professional bodies. Study 
used stratified random sampling technique to select 
samples from different sectors of the economy. 
Pearson correlation analysis and the linear multiple 
regression were used to study the multi co-linearity 
among the variables. Analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was used to show which variables are 
dependent. 
 
Empirical findings show that institutions should 
embrace separation of the position of the chairman 
to the board and that of the chief executive officer. 
Further analysis shows that there exists a 
relationship between board size and performance; 
and that there is no effect of directors’ stockholding 
on firm performance. 
 
Introduction 
 
The importance of the board of directors to 
corporate developments cannot be overemphasized. 
The composition or structure of the board varies 
from country to country. In the US, largely 
populated companies have their Boards’ chairmen 
and chief executive officers (CEO) combined. This 
is generally referred to as ‘CEO duality’. 
 
However, countries like the United Kingdom and 
Nigeria have the positions of the corporate chairman 
and that of the chief executive officer (CEO) 
separated. This separation enables a check and 
balance system. The chairman to the board focuses 
on the overall control of the company; while the 
CEO oversees the management of the day to day 
running of the business with the aid of his executives 
who are actively in charge of various departments 
that co-exist in the organization.  
 
Meanwhile, the board consists of non-executive and 
executive members. The non-executive members are 
expected to be independent. They checkmate the 
excesses of the CEO and his executives. This 
implies that the Board must at all times represent the 
interest of all the corporate stakeholders.  
 
The board of directors has the power to hire and fire, 
even the CEO and also to act in various capacities. 
In theory, the board has enough power to perform its 
fiduciary duties. How true this can be in practice 
remains a rhetoric. A lot of scholars have questioned 
the power of the board and have termed it as mere 
formal authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Weber 
(1968) highlights the boards have formal authority to 
overrule the decisions of executive directors; though 
the non-executive directors often have insufficient 
information to effect prompt and prudent corrective 
actions. 
 
The revised Code of Corporate Governance of 
September 2009 sheds more light on this as it affects 
Nigeria. The code focuses on so many issues. It 
recognizes the importance of separation of power 
between the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the 
Board Chairman. From this, one could conclude that 
Nigeria adopts a two-tier mode of corporate 
governance. 
 
It also recommends that the number of the non-
executives in the board should be more than the 
executives who must not exceed the maximum board 
size of twenty (20) directors. It is also stipulated in 
the code that no board member should serve for a 
period exceeding twelve years (12) on the board 
which consists of four (4) years in three terms.  
 
Research Design 
 
This study adopted survey research method to find 
the relationship that exists between the structure 
and composition of the board of directors and 
profitability. The method enabled the collection of 
quantitative data from financial statements and 
annual reports. The population of study comprises 
companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
This study used stratified random sampling 
technique. The sample size for the population was 5 
institutions listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
  
Samples were obtained at random from different 
sectors of the economy.  
 
Data Analysis and Discussion of Results 
 
The nature of data used for the study is secondary. 
The secondary data involved the analysis of 
corporate governance structures such as (board size, 
board composition, board ownership, and CEO 
duality) on corporate performance which was 
measured with ROCE (return on capital employed), 
and ROE (return on equity). 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 
 
ROE ROCE Board Size Board Composition Board Ownership CEO Duality 
10.1 10 10 0.1 0.51 1 
40.9 29.1 11 54.5 5.8 1 
16.3 15.4 8 0.75 0.18 1 
9.3 12.6 8 37.5 6.5 1 
2.54 6 12 91.7 8.6 1 
Source: Field survey 
 
A total number of five companies were selected in 
Nigeria. Annual reports were gotten from the 
selected institutions in order to obtain information 
about board characteristics. The data obtained from 
the financial statements were used to compute their 
ROE and ROCE. The institutions include 
SOVEREIGN TRUST INSURANCE, DANGOTE 
PLC, ASHAKA CEMENT, AND OANDO PLC. 
 
Analysis of Data 
 
The table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of all 
the variables used in the study. The mean ROE of 
the sampled firms is #16 and the mean of ROCE is 
#15. The results indicate that for every #100 
invested on equity there is a return of #16. In the 
same vein, return on every #100 of capital 
employed is #15. The average board size of the five 
firms used in this study is 10. On the average, the 
proportion of the non-executive directors sitting on 
the board is 37%.  
 
The result also indicates that the average proportion 
of total equity owned by the executive and non-
executive directors is 4%. The result also reveals 
that 100% of the sampled firms have separate 
persons occupying the posts of the chief executive 
and that of the board chairman. 
 
 
Table 4.2 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean Std. Deviation Variance 
CEO DUALITY 5 1 1 5 1.00 .000 .000 
BOARD 
OWNERSHIP 
5 .18 8.60 21.59 4.3180 3.77216 14.229 
BOARD COMP 5 .10 91.70 184.55 36.9100 38.64655 1493.556 
BOARD SIZE 5 8 12 49 9.80 1.789 3.200 
ROCE 5 6.0 29.1 73.1 14.620 8.8035 77.502 
ROE 5 2.5400 40.9000 79.1400 15.828000 14.8393369 220.206 
Valid N (list wide) 5       
Source: Field Survey, 2014 
 
Table 4.2: shows the descriptive statistics of the companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Board Size and Financial Performance 
 
A Pearson correlation analysis was performed to 
check the degree of multi co-linearity among the 
variables. The results are shown in tables 4.3 and 
4.4 respectively; ROE is positively correlated with 
board size though not significant at (0.873). The 
result shown in Table 4.3, shows also that ROCE is 
positively correlated with board size and it appears 
not significant at (0.994).  
 
Table 4.6 shows the result of the coefficient 
estimates with ROCE as dependent variable. The 
board structure variable (board size) is not 
significant at p-value < 0.05, while for ROE board 
size is also not significant at p-value <0.05.This 
result however rejects the null hypothesis that there 
is a negative relationship between board size and 
financial performance. 
 
Board Composition and Financial Performance 
 
A Pearson correlation analysis was performed to 
check the degree of multi co-linearity among the 
variables. The results are shown in table 4.3 and 4.4 
respectively; ROE is positively correlated with 
board composition though not significant at 
(0.946). The result shown in Table 4.3, shows also 
that ROCE is positively correlated with board 
composition though not significant at (0.928).  
 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the results of coefficient 
estimate with ROCE and ROE respectively as 
dependent variable. The board structure (board 
composition) is not significant at p-value <0.05. 
For ROE, board structure (board composition) is 
not significant at p-value <0.05. This result 
establishes that there is a negative relationship 
between board composition and corporate financial 
performance. That is, the proportional mix of 
executive and non-executive directors has nothing 
to do with corporate financial performance. 
 
Board Ownership and Financial Performance 
 
A Pearson correlation analysis was performed to 
check the degree of multi co-linearity among the 
variables. The results as shown in tables 4.3 and 4.4 
indicate that ROCE is positively correlated with 
board ownership though not significant at (0.947). 
Table 4.4 also indicates that there is a relationship 
between ROE and board ownership though not 
significant at (0.920). 
 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the results of coefficient 
estimate with ROCE and ROE respectively as 
dependent variable. The board structure (board 
ownership) is not significant at p-value <0.05 for 
both ROE and ROCE. Hence, following the result 
of this analysis, there is a positive relationship 
between directors’ stockholding and financial 
performance. 
 
CEO Duality and Corporate Financial 
Performance 
 
A Pearson correlation analysis was performed to 
check the degree of relationship between CEO 
duality and the dependent variables (ROE and 
ROCE). The results shown in table 4.3 and 4.4 
indicate a positive correlation between CEO duality 
and ROE which is significant at (0.000).  
 
Similar result also appears for the relationship 
between ROCE and CEO duality which is 
significant at (0.000). The result of coefficient 
estimate of ROCE as dependent variable shows that 
CEO duality is significant at p-value 0.05. This 
means that there is a relationship between CEO 
duality and ROCE. The same result also obtained 
for ROE. Study therefore accepts the null 
hypothesis. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
From the output of the analysis in table 4.4b and 
4.5b, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) returns 
non-significant p-values of 0.999 and 0.996 for 
ROCE and ROE respectively. 
 
Findings 
 
Nicholson and Kiel (2007:588) identified that 
outside directors do not have a positive effect on 
performance. Following the argument that inside 
directors live in the company they govern; they 
better understand the businesses than outside 
directors and so can make better decisions. 
 
Dalton et al. (1998) observed in the analysis of 54 
studies and found out there is no link between 
insider-outsider ratio and company financial 
performance and showed neither the size of the 
company nor the measures used for director type or 
company performance, affected the findings. 
 
De Andres et al. (2005) observed a negative 
relationship between board size and firm 
performance. 
 
Corporations ought to be encouraged to embrace 
the concept of the separation of the positions of the 
chairman to the board and that of the position of the 
chief executive officer. The five companies that 
were studied all had different persons occupying 
the positions of both chairman to the board and that 
of the CEO. The analysis showed positive and 
significant relationship. This development shows 
that Nigerian firms are complying with the codes of 
corporate governance. 
 
The secondary analysis shows that there exists a 
relationship between board size and performance 
though not significant. Similar results also appear 
for board ownership, and board composition. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Dehane et 
al. (2001). 
  
This study also finds out that there is no effect of 
directors owning shares on firms’ performance 
(measured by ROE and ROCE respectively. 
 
 
An area where this research can be further 
developed is on the area of disenfranchisement of 
shareholders through the location, time and venue 
of the Annual General Meetings (AGM). 
 
  
ROCE 
BOARD 
SIZE 
BOARD 
COMP 
BOARD 
OWNERSHIP 
CEO 
DUALITY 
ROCE Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.004 -.057 -.041 .
a
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .994 .928 .947 . 
N 5 5 5 5 5 
BOARD SIZE Pearson 
Correlation 
-.004 1 .717 .517 .
a
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .994  .173 .372 . 
N 5 5 5 5 5 
BOARD COMP Pearson 
Correlation 
-.057 .717 1 .946
*
 .
a
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .928 .173  .015 . 
N 5 5 5 5 5 
BOARD 
OWNERSHIP 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.041 .517 .946
*
 1 .
a
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .947 .372 .015  . 
N 5 5 5 5 5 
CEO DUALITY Pearson 
Correlation 
.
a
 .
a
 .
a
 .
a
 .
a
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . . .  
N 5 5 5 5 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 4.4a. Model Summary 
  Model   R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .131
a
 .017 -2.931 17.4542 2.010 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BOARD OWNERSHIP, BOARD SIZE , BOARD COMP 
b. Dependent Variable: ROCE 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4b ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5.358 3 1.786 .006 .999
a
 
Residual 304.650 1 304.650   
Total 310.008 4    
a. Predictors: (Constant), BOARD OWNERSHIP, BOARD SIZE , BOARD COMP 
b. Dependent Variable: ROCE 
4.6. Coefficients Estimates 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4.322 93.587  .046 .971 
BOARD SIZE 1.139 10.028 .232 .114 .928 
BOARD COMP -.153 1.228 -.670 -.124 .921 
BOARD 
OWNERSHIP 
1.104 10.245 .473 .108 .932 
a. Dependent Variable: ROCE 
Table 4.4. results of Correlations – ROE as a financial performance measure (N=5) 
  
ROE 
BOARD 
SIZE 
BOARD 
COMP 
BOARD 
OWNERSHIP 
CEO 
DUALITY 
ROE Pearson Correlation 1 .100 -.042 -.063 .
a
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .873 .946 .920 . 
N 5 5 5 5 5 
BOARD SIZE Pearson Correlation .100 1 .717 .517 .
a
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .873  .173 .372 . 
N 5 5 5 5 5 
BOARD 
COMPOSITION 
Pearson Correlation -.042 .717 1 .946
*
 .
a
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .946 .173  .015 . 
N 5 5 5 5 5 
BOARD 
OWNERSHIP 
Pearson Correlation -.063 .517 .946
*
 1 .
a
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .920 .372 .015  . 
N 5 5 5 5 5 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7.Coefficients Estimates 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant)      
 BOARD SIZE -13.460 155.530  -.087 .945 
BOARD COMP 3.320 16.666 .400 .199 .875 
BOARD -.271 2.041 -.705 -.133 .916 
OWNERSHIP 1.563 17.027 .397 .092 .942 
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
 
 
 
CEO DUALITY Pearson Correlation .
a
 .
a
 .
a
 .
a
 .
a
 
Sig. (2-tailed) . . . .  
N 5 5 5 5 5 
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4.5a. Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .212
a
 .045 -2.821 29.0067025 2.010 
a. Predictors: (Constant), BOARD OWNERSHIP, BOARD SIZE , BOARD COMP 
b. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Table 4.5b. ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 39.435 3 13.145 .016 .996
a
 
Residual 841.389 1 841.389   
Total 880.824 4    
a. Predictors: (Constant), BOARD OWNERSHIP, BOARD SIZE , BOARD COMP 
b. Dependent Variable: ROE 
 
 
  
Conclusion 
 
The adoption of the principles of corporate 
governance is essential to the continuous existence 
of any modern day large corporation. It is therefore 
imperative for corporations to be cognizance of all 
its stakeholders; within or without. 
 
Corporate governance principles are the ethics, the 
rules, the justifiable morals that ensures a check and 
balance mechanism, which guarantees fairness to 
all the corporate stakeholders. The main objective 
of a firm amongst all other objectives is to 
maximize profit and protect the economy of the 
agents who have provided capital to the firm.  
 
Balancing good stakeholders’ interests is the 
responsibility of the board. So many have argued 
about how the board should be composed or 
structured in terms of size, composition, 
shareholding, gender and so on. This study has 
successfully discussed and analyzed the impact of 
board composition and structure on corporate 
financial performance in Nigeria. 
 
Moreover, the study concludes that the effect of 
Board composition and structure on corporate 
financial performance can be in two phases. This 
was derived from when the study examined the 
relationship between Board sizes and financial 
performance, the null hypothesis was rejected. This 
implies that there is an established positive 
relationship between Board size and financial 
performance. On the other hand, the study found 
out that there is a negative relationship between 
Board composition and financial performance. This 
in effect means that the proportional mix of 
executive and non-executive directors have nothing 
to do with corporate financial performance. 
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